Abstract-Motivated by security and privacy considerations in a variety of applications of discrete event systems, we describe and analyze the computational complexity required for verifying the notion of -step opacity for systems that are modeled as nondeterministic finite automata with partial observation on their transitions. Specifically, a system is -step opaque if, at any specific point within the last observations, the entrance of the system state to a given set of secret states remains opaque (uncertain) to an intruder who has complete knowledge of the system model and observes system activity through some natural projection map. We provide two methods for verifying -step opacity using two different state estimator constructions, and analyze the computational complexity of both.
ious notions of security and privacy. A number of such notions focus on characterizing the information flow from the system to the intruder [1] , [2] . Opacity falls in this category and aims at determining whether a given system's secret behavior (i.e., a subset of the behavior of the system that is considered critical and is usually represented by a predicate) is kept opaque to outsiders [3] , [4] . More specifically, this requires that the intruder (modeled as an observer of the system's behavior) never be able to establish the truth of the predicate.
Discrete-event systems (DESs) are discrete-state, eventdriven dynamical systems in which the state space is described by a discrete set, and states evolve in terms of asynchronous occurrences of discrete events over time [5] . Such systems with crisp states and events have been successfully applied to provide a formal treatment of many man-made systems such as communication systems, networked systems, manufacturing systems, and automated traffic systems [5] . In this paper, we consider opacity with respect to state-based predicates in a DES that can be modeled as a nondeterministic finite automaton with partial observation on its transitions. Assuming that the initial state of the system is (partially) known, we define the secret behavior of the system as the evolution of the system's state within a known subset of secret states . Examples to motivate the study of such state-based notions of opacity are provided in our earlier work [6] , and are briefly reviewed later in this paper for completeness. Among other applications, they include encryption using key strings provided by pseudorandom generators, coverage properties of mobile agents in sensor networks, and anonymity requirements in protocols for web transactions.
This paper defines and analyzes the state-based notion of -step opacity (for ) by requiring that the entrance of the system state to the set of secret states , at any observation point within the past observations, remain opaque to the intruder. In other words, in a -step opaque system the intruder (which is assumed to have full knowledge of the system model and to be able to track the observable transitions in the system via the observation of associated labels) cannot determine with certainty that the state of the system or observations ago belonged to the set of secret states . Our analysis starts by first establishing that a system is -step opaque if and only if none of the -delayed, , state estimates (i.e., estimates of the state of the system observations ago which are consistent with all observations, including the last observations) fall entirely within the set of secret states . In order to capture the -delayed state estimates , we construct the -delay state estimator (KDE) using two methods: (i) by storing the compatible -delayed state estimate and remembering the last observations and (ii) by storing the compatible sequences of the last -visited states. We compare the space complexity of the KDEs that result from these two methods and show that it is more state space efficient to store the compatible sequences of the last -visited states than to store the sequence of the last observations.
Apart from our own work in [4] , [6] , and [7] (which looked at various state-based notions of opacity), the work in this paper is related to some of the existing security work in the area of DESs. In particular, reference [8] focuses on finite state Petri nets and defines opacity with respect to state-based predicates; our work in [4] , [7] , and in this paper essentially studies and solves this problem for the case of (nondeterministic) finite automata, also introducing in the process the notion of -step opacity (not present in either [3] or [8] ). The authors of [9] consider multiple intruders modeled as observers with different observation capabilities (namely, different natural projection maps) and require that no intruder be able to determine that the actual trajectory of the system belongs to the secret language assigned to that intruder. Assuming that the supervisor can observe/control all events, sufficient conditions for the existence of a supervisor with a finite number of states are subsequently proposed. The assumptions on the controllability and observability of events are partially relaxed in [10] , where the authors consider a single intruder that might observe different events than the ones observed/controlled by the supervisor. In contrast to [9] and [10] (which follow a language-based approach), opacity in our framework assumes that the states of the system can be partitioned into secret and non-secret ones; this state-based formulation is what leads to the use of various state estimators to verify opacity. Also, note that the notions of opacity introduced here are not considered in [9] and [10] , and (as explained in [7] ) they cannot be easily captured by the language framework of [9] and [10] except for very special cases. Related to our work here is also the work in [11] , where the authors partition the event set into high-level and low-level events, and consider the verification of intransitive interference, a property that captures the allowed information flow from high-level events to low-level events through a downgrading process (i.e., the inference of the occurrence of certain high level events from low level events). Our model of the intruder's capability (in terms of observability power) is different from [11] which makes the two frameworks hard to compare. However, for the case when there is no downgrading process, the notion of noninterference can be translated to an instance of zero-step opacity [7] . Note that, in general, one cannot formulate the notion of -step opacity for in the framework of [11] .
II. PRELIMINARIES AND BACKGROUND
Let be an alphabet and denote by the set of all finitelength strings of elements of , including the empty string . For any string denotes the length of (with taken to be zero). A language is a subset of finite-length strings in . A language is finite if it contains only a finite number of strings. We say that a finite language is of length if the maximum length of the strings in is . For a string denotes the prefix-closure of and is defined as , where denotes the concatenation of strings and . The post-string of after is defined as , where [5] .
A DES is modeled in this paper as a nondeterministic finite automaton , where is the set of states, is the set of events, (where is the power set of ) is the nondeterministic state transition function, and is the set of possible initial states. The function can be extended from the domain to the domain in the routine recursive manner: for and with . The behavior of DES is captured by . We use to denote the set of all traces that originate from state of (so that ). In general, only a subset of the events can be observed, so that is partitioned into two sets, the set of observable events and the set of unobservable events (note that and ). The natural projection is typically used to map any trace executed in the system to the sequence of observations associated with it. This projection is defined recursively as , with if and if [5] . (More general projections of the form that may map multiple events to the same label from the set can also be handled in a straightforward manner; to keep notation simple we only discuss the natural projection in this paper.)
Upon observing some string (sequence of observations) , the state of the system might not be identifiable uniquely due to the lack of precise knowledge of the initial state, the nondeterminism that is present in the state transition function, and the partial observation of events. We denote the set of states that the system is possibly in given that was observed as the (current) state estimate . Similarly, we denote the set of states that the system was possibly in when it generated the to last output (i.e., the state of the system observations ago) following a sequence of observations as the -delayed state estimate and define it formally below. 1 Note that while the definition of -step opacity studied in [7] is simpler and more intuitive, it is only suitable for deterministic automata; Definition 2, however, can be used for nondeterministic automata. For with we say that passes through state when passes through state if there exists , and such that , while (i) and (ii) and have continuations from states and , respectively. According to Definition 2, DES is -opaque if for every string in that visits a state in within the past observations (and has a continuation from ), there exists a string in with such that when string passes through the state in , string passes through a state in (and has a continuation from ). Note that could be the same as , in which case would be passing through both secret and nonsecret states. Similarly, and can be the same.
Remark 3: The notion of -step opacity is suitable for cases where there exists a bounded delay, after which one does not care if the outside observer can infer information about behavior that was previously considered secret (e.g., because the secret transaction has completed or because the intrusion will be detected). Motivated by applications where the existence of such bound might not be viable, we introduced in [13] the notion of infinite-step opacity which can be seen as -opacity with but requires different techniques for its verification.
A. Motivational Example
There are many areas where -step opacity can be used to characterize security requirements of interest. In the sequel, we discuss an example in the context of tracking problems in sensor networks. More details can be found in [6] . Note that a number of tools are already available for verifying notions of opacity, including -step opacity (see for example [14] ).
Example 4: Consider a vehicle capable of moving on a twodimensional space modeled as a two-dimensional array of cells [in Fig. 1 (a) we show a toy 2 2 grid]. The possible vehicle movements in this space can be described via a kinematic model (a finite state machine) whose states are associated with the state (position) of the vehicle and whose transitions correspond to the possible movements of the vehicle at this position. Fig. 1(b) depicts an example of a kinematic model for a vehicle that moves on the grid of Fig. 1(a) .
Typically, the sensor network that is deployed in this space will not capture all movements of the vehicle and hence the observation of movements will be partial. If each sensor detects the presence of the vehicle in a cell or in some aggregation of cells, then when the vehicle passes through a cell within the coverage of a sensor, this sensor emits a signal that indicates this event. Thus, we can enhance the kinematic model by assigning label to all transitions that end in a cell that belongs to the coverage area of sensor . Since sensor coverages may overlap, the label of transitions ending in areas which are covered by more than one sensor can be chosen to be a special label that indicates the set of all the sensors covering that location. In Fig. 1(c) , we depict the (nondeterministic) automaton that models both the kinematic model of the vehicle and the corresponding sensor readings for a particular choice of sensor coverage areas. Dotted arrows correspond to transitions in locations that are not covered by any sensor.
One of the questions that might arise in the above context is that of characterizing all trajectories (sequences of states) that a vehicle can follow such that the passage of each trajectory from specific locations at specific observation points (points in time with respect to observation) remain ambiguous to the sensor network. These trajectories can be of interest for a variety of reasons. For example, they can be employed to hide the origin of a trajectory from an observer who is employing the sensor network [e.g., an observer who is observing the labels in Fig. 1 (c)] trying to identify whether the origin belongs to a set of secret (strategically important) locations or whether the vehicle passed from this particular set of locations at some specific instant of time. Such questions can be answered using the opacity framework of this paper. An extensive analysis of how existing tools can be adjusted to answer verification of tracking properties can be found in [15] .
B. Related Notion: Trajectory-Based -Step Opacity
It is easy to verify that the system in Fig. 2 is two-step opaque with respect to ; however, upon observing , the intruder is certain that, regardless of the state sequence that has occurred, the system has visited a secret state within the last two observations (although one cannot determine exactly when this happened). This system can be considered as insecure if the attacker is only interested in determining whether the system has reached secret states at any point during the last observations. We refer to a system for which this scenario does not occur as a trajectory-based -step opaque system. It is not hard to see that DES is trajectory-based -step opaque if and only if for any given sequence of observations , there always exists at least one sequence of states that can follow such that only non-secret states are visited, while generating the last events in . Moreover, a system that is trajectory-based -step opaque is also -step opaque; but the converse is not necessarily true.
Note that the essential difference between -step opacity and trajectory-based -step opacity is the time at which the state of the system is exposed. Depending on the application, -step opacity might be a more suitable requirement than trajectory-based -step opacity for characterizing security requirements. For instance, suppose the DES in Fig. 2 is a communication protocol for a bank transaction where a user has two options: communicate important account information while at state 1 (secret state) and dummy information while at states 3 and 5 (non-secret states), or communicate dummy information at states 2 and 4 (non-secret states) and important account information while at state 6 (secret state). If an eavesdropper does not know which of the two options the user has followed (due to the unobservable event ), then (even though she/he knows that important account information has been communicated) she/he does not know when this was done. Therefore, the fact that the system is two-step opaque is critical (despite the fact that the system is not trajectory-based two-step opaque).
As another example, consider a pseudorandom generator that is used for generating a key string in encryption applications. Such a pseudorandom generator is usually implemented as an autonomous finite state machine that cycles through a large number of states. In this case, knowing that the system was in a particular state at a specific point in the past (as captured by -step opacity) is indeed important because this exposes the subsequent sequence of states and thus the key string used for encryption. On the other hand, knowing that the system has been in a particular state in the recent past (as captured by trajectory-based -step opacity) offers little information (in fact, it offers zero information if is larger than the number of states of the pseudorandom generator).
IV. VERIFICATION OF -STEP OPACITY
USING STATE ESTIMATORS In this section, we show that for a DES to be -step opaque, it is necessary and sufficient that each -delayed state estimate , associated with a sequence of observations contain at least one state outside the set of secret states (unless the sequence of observations cannot be generated by in which case ). The proof is straight forward and is not included due to space limitations. The reader can find it in [16] .
Theorem 5: Given a nondeterministic finite automaton , a projection map with respect to the set of observable events
, and a set of secret states , automaton is -opaque if and only if for all (1) where is the -delayed state estimate associated with the sequence of observations . Existing state estimation techniques cannot verify -step opacity since they are not tracking the -delayed state estimates,
. For this reason, in this paper we introduce the -delay state estimator (KDE) which is a (deterministic) finite automaton that reconstructs the -delayed state estimates associated with a given sequence of observations . In the sequel, we introduce two methods for constructing -delay state estimators: (i) by storing the possible sequences of the last -visited states via -dimensional state mappings and (ii) by storing the -delayed state estimates, , and remembering the sequence of the last observations. We also discuss the state complexity of the KDEs that result from these two methods, once we have the opportunity to describe them formally.
A. State Mapping-Based -Delay State Estimator (SM-KDE)
The Fig. 1(d) with and . For this system, the two-delay state estimator is represented in Fig. 3(a) along with the three-dimensional state mappings needed in the construction. The initial state of the system is and the initial state of the two-delay state estimator captures this in via a three-dimensional state mapping that maps each system state to itself as . Starting from the initial state, assume that we observe . The state mapping induced by observing is which implies that can be observed only from states 0, 2, and 4. Moreover, if the initial state was 0, the current state can only be one of the states in ; however, if the initial state was 2, the current state could only be 2; finally, if the initial state was 4, the current state would be 4. Following observation , the next state in the two-delay state estimator can be constructed as . Next, consider the case when following observation we observe . As the induced state mapping , we have . This implies that can only be observed if the system follows the state trajectory . Using this approach for all possible observations (from each state), the two-delay state estimator construction can be completed, as shown in Fig. 3(a) . Note that we have not included the state that corresponds to the all empty state mapping (and any transitions from/to it) to avoid cluttering the diagram.
Remark 8: On the right of Fig. 3(a) , we use three-dimensional trellis diagrams to describe the triples associated with states of the two-delay state estimator. In general, we can graphically represent an induced -dimensional state mapping using a -dimensional trellis diagram, i.e., a -partite graph where the nodes in the state set are replicated times and ordered into vertical slices ranging from slice 0 to slice (hence, a -dimensional trellis diagram has nodes with ). Each node at slice is either isolated or connected to (at least) one node at slice and (at least) one node at slice . The nodes at slice 0 are either isolated or connected to (at least) one node at slice . In the following theorem, we show that the SM-KDE state that is reached via a sequence of observations is associated with a -dimensional state mapping such that the first observations would have taken the system to the starting states of the -dimensional state mapping and, in addition, the last observations could have taken place from these starting states, visiting in the process the intermediate states in the tuple, in the order captured by the elements of the -dimensional state mapping. The proof is provided in [16] .
Theorem 9: Suppose SM-KDE state (as constructed in Definition 6) is reachable from the SM-KDE initial state via the string . Then, SM-KDE state can be characterized as follows. i) :
. ii) :
when there is no such that .
The proof of the following corollaries can also be found in [16] .
Corollary 10: The -delayed state estimate , after observing is given by , where . Corollary 10 proves that the SM-KDE captures the set of all -delayed state estimates, , via its -dimensional state mappings and, hence, by Theorem 5, it can be used for verifying -step opacity.
Corollary 11: Discrete event system is -opaque if and only if for all (2) where is the set of states in that are reachable from the initial state . Example 12: DES in Fig. 1(d) with is not -opaque due to the existence of state (or ) in the state mapping-based two-delay state estimator depicted in Fig. 3(a) . If the system generates the sequence of observations (or ), then (since the only state from which or can be observed is state 0) we can conclude with certainty that the system was in state 0 two steps ago. This violates the two-step opacity requirement since state 0 is a secret state. The unit-delay state estimator for this system is shown in Fig. 3(b) (again we have not included the state that corresponds to the empty state mapping); it can be verified that for each of the two-dimensional state mappings associated with its states, every set of intermediate states contains at least one element outside . Hence, DES is -opaque.
B. Observation Sequence-Based -Delay State Estimator (OS-KDE)
In this section, we introduce the construction of automaton which captures -delayed state estimates by remembering the sequence of the last observations (this should be contrasted to which captures the compatible sequences of the last -visited states via -dimensional state mappings). At each state of , we store a -tuple consisting of the following information: (i) the last observations ( denotes the set to account for less than observations), and (ii) all the -delayed state estimates for . Upon observing a new event, the -delayed state estimates are updated to ensure that estimates that are not consistent with the last observation are removed. Finally, the string that stores the last observations is updated by adding the last observation to the end of it and by removing the first one. The main difference here is that only remembers the sets of states that are possible observations ago but does not explicitly record the sequences of states that are possible; however, knowledge of the last observations (together with the underlying system model) allows one to reconstruct these sequences if required. We now discuss the systematic construction of . For brevity, we define the function for any and as (3) The function can be extended from the domain to the domain in the routine recursive manner: for and with . With a slight abuse of notation, we use to also denote its extension from states to sets of states as follows: for all define . For clarity, we also introduce the following notation: let with denote the sequence of observations that have been seen so far (from the initialization of the system); we will rename the last observations to (i.e., for ) to make the discussion independent of (the total number of observations seen so far). Also note that in the following definition strings of length less than are represented as . The OS-KDE introduced in Definition 13 is related to the inverter with delay that was introduced in [17] . Assuming that the system is invertible with delay, the inverter in [17] acts as an online algorithm which, for a given time index, stores the subsequent observations (where is the fixed delay in the definition of invertibility with delay) in order to be able to refine the state estimate at this time index (using back propagation). The refined state estimate that is obtained is used along with the plant model to reconstruct the executed sequence of events. The observation sequence-based KDE is a finite structure that captures all estimates with delay for any observation sequence. In other words, what we do here can be seen as an offline approach for refining the current state estimate using any possible sequence of observations and future observations. This is necessary when trying to verify system properties that depend on delayed state estimates (such as -step opacity).
Example 15: Consider the DES in Fig. 1(d) . For this system, the observation sequence-based two-delayed state estimator is represented in Fig. 4 to DES G in Fig. 1(d) .
OS-KDE state conveys the following information: the current state estimate is , the previous state estimate is , and the estimate of the system state two observations ago is . Also, captures the last two observations (observed in that order). Using this approach for the remaining possible observations, the observation sequencebased two-delayed state estimator can be completed, as shown in Fig. 4 (states associated with empty state estimates of the form and transitions from/to these state have not been included). Note that the SM-KDE and OS-KDE in Fig. 3(a) and (b), respectively, are identical automata but, as clarified later on, this will not necessarily be the case in general.
In the sequel, we obtain a characterization of each set of states , in the OS-KDE state reached via a sequence of observations . Specifically, if , we show that , if and only if there exists a string in that has projection , and visits state exactly observations ago; if there does not exist such that , then . Furthermore, if , then , is as described above and for . The following theorem states this formally; the proof is provided in [16] .
Theorem 16: Consider the OS-KDE constructed as in Definition 13 and suppose that state is reachable from the OS-KDE initial state via the string . Then, the OS-KDE state can be characterized as follows: i) :
, when there is no such that .
The proof for the following corollary can also be found in [16] .
Corollary 17: The -delayed state estimate , after observing is given by , where . Corollary 17 proves that the OS-KDE captures the set of all -delayed state estimates, , via its -tuples and hence, by Theorem 5, it can be used for verifying -step opacity.
Corollary 18: Discrete event system G is -opaque if and only if for all ,
where is the set of states in that are reachable from the initial state . Example 19: As discussed in Example 12, DES in Fig. 1(d) with is not -opaque since observing the sequence of observations (or ) reveals that the system was in state 0 two steps ago and state 0 is a secret state. Note that in the observation sequence-based two-delay state estimator (depicted in Fig. 4 ) the states reachable via (or ) are (or ). The two-delayed state estimate associated with either of these states is and falls entirely within the set of secret states, which indicates that the system is not -opaque.
C. Analysis of State-Space Complexity for -Delay State Estimators 1) State Complexity of OS-KDE:
The construction of suggests that its number of states could be as high as , where denotes the number of states of the given automaton . However, as we argue next, its state complexity is which is significantly lower.
Theorem 20: Given a nondeterministic finite automaton and a natural projection map with respect to the set of observable events , the state complexity of (constructed according to Definition 13) is , where denotes the number of states of the given automaton .
Proof: We establish the state space complexity of by observing that given: (i) the sequence of the past observations and (ii) the -delayed state estimate , the intermediate -delayed state estimates can be reconstructed uniquely using our knowledge of the plant model. First, note that given (i) and (ii), the current-state estimate, by definition, is readily available via . Next, we construct the intermediate -delayed state estimates in two steps.
Step 1) Construct sets of states as the set of states reachable in , from states in via a string that produces the sequence of observations . Following the notation in (3), we have .
Step number of states of is less than or equal to the number of states of and hence establishes that the state space complexity of is also . The following theorem states and proves this formally. Due to space limitations, only a sketch of the proof is provided. The detailed proof can be found in [16] .
Theorem 22: Given a nondeterministic finite automaton and a natural projection map with respect to the set of observable events , the state complexity of (constructed according to Definition 6) is , where denotes the number of states of the given automaton .
Sketch of the Proof: To prove that the set of states of the SM-KDE, denoted by , has cardinality equal to or less than the set of states of the OS-KDE, denoted by , we define a function and show that for all : a) ; b) for each , there exists at least one such that . The establishment of these two properties proves that the number of elements in the set is less than or equal to the number of elements in the set . We define the mapping as follows. i) For :
ii) For :
Function maps an OS-KDE state to a set of -tuples of states such that each state in this tuple is chosen from the corresponding delayed state estimate and also such that the system can visit the sequence of states and produce the sequence of observations . We can show the function satisfies property (a) by using the characterization of in Theorem 16 and property (b) by using the characterization of in Theorem 9.
Note that for DES in Fig. 1(d) , the number of states for both estimators is the same (indeed they are isomorphic) which shows that the introduced mapping between the states of these two estimators can be one-to-one. Note, however, that this is not necessarily the case. Consider, for example, the DES in Fig. 5(a) with initial state set . Fig. 5 (b) and (c) depict and , respectively. As can be seen, storing the last observation results in creating more states compared to storing the two-dimensional state mapping corresponding to the last two states visited.
Remark 23: The exponential complexity of the algorithms proposed in this paper for verifying -step opacity is not desirable for implementation purposes. However, in [7] , we showed that deciding whether the nondeterministic finite automaton is -step opaque is NP-hard for . This implies that it is unlikely that any algorithm can verify -step opacity in polynomial time. For more details, refer to [7] .
V. ROLE OF DELAY IN -STEP OPACITY In this section, we show that for -step opacity and -step opacity are equivalent. Note that -step opacity does not in general imply -step opacity for [in fact, Example 12 demonstrates this for the system in Fig. 1(d) ] though the converse is trivially true ( -step opacity implies -step opacity for ). The idea behind the proof is the following: fix a point in the system's state trajectory. In the -step opacity problem, we are interested in finding how much we can say regarding the membership of the state, at that fixed point in time, to the set of secret states, after we make additional observations. We can gain insight to this question by considering the estimate of the state at this fixed point as the initial uncertainty for an initial-state estimation problem. In [6] , we studied the problem of initial-state estimation for a nondeterministic finite automaton: given a sequence of observations and a set of possible initial states , initial-state estimation requires the enumeration of all states that belong to and that could have generated this sequence of observations . We called these states the , where is the -dimensional state mapping associated with the state reached in via satisfies . Now, consider the fixed point in time after the sequence of observations has been observed. Once more observations are made (i.e., once are observed), the set denotes the -delayed state estimate at that fixed point due to the sequence of observations . Similarly, denotes the -delayed state estimates of that fixed point due to the sequence of observations for . In other words, represents the -delayed state estimate, if after the passage of the system through the state at that fixed point is observed, whereas denotes the -delayed state estimate at this same point if is observed. To prove Theorem 24, we need to show that assuming , there exists an such that the -delayed state estimate at that same fixed time due to a shorter sequence of observations with is the same as the -delayed state estimate of that fixed point due to the sequence of observations . Denote the estimate of the system's (current) state at that point (i.e., the estimate after observing ) by . The problem of -delayed estimation of the state of the system at the fixed point in time after observing can be viewed as an initial-state estimation problem, where (due to the observations that have been made before reaching that fixed point) the initial uncertainty about the "initial state" is the set . Hence, the set after observing is the same as the set of starting states of the state mapping that is associated with the state that is reached via in the ISE whose initial state is associated with the state mapping . Note that the string has length . Since the ISE has at most states, strings of length at most can be chosen to visit any (reachable) ISE state. This implies that the state reached in this ISE via the string of length can also be reached via a string of length less than or equal to , which we denote by for some . Since the states reached in the ISE via either of these strings are identical, the -delayed state estimate due to is the same as the -delayed state estimate due to . This completes the proof.
The above result can be used to show that -step opacity is equivalent to -step opacity for . We prove this by showing that for -step opacity is equivalent to -step opacity with . The proof can be found in [16] .
Theorem 25: For a nondeterministic finite automaton -step opacity is equivalent to -step opacity for , where .
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we defined, analyzed, and characterized the notion of -step opacity for discrete event systems that can be modeled as nondeterministic finite automata. The notion of -step opacity, for , requires that the entrance of the system to a set of secret states , at any time during the past observations, remains opaque (uncertain) to outsiders. To verify -step opacity, we introduced the -delay state estimator which provides -delayed state estimates. These are the estimates of the state of the system observations ago and are consistent with all observations so far (including the last observations). We show that for a system to be -step opaque, all -delayed state estimates (associated with states of the -delay state estimator) need to contain at least one state outside the secret set . The proposed verification method has state complexity , where denotes the number of states of the given automaton .
